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Abstract 
 Social Impact Investing (SII), defined as investment that aims to 
create a positive social impact in addition to a financial return, is a promising 
approach to solving pressing social issues. One of the key topics in this 
context is a new “pay-for-performance” financing instrument for social 
services that has been implemented in the UK, the US and Australia to 
facilitate impact investments: Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). The extension of 
the scope of the SIB outcomes-based model to achieve improved social 
outcomes in developing countries implies the use of Developing Impact 
Bonds (DIBs). The adaption of the SIB approach for developing countries is 
the most recent financial innovation derived from the impact investing 
industry. This work using a multiple case study approach, provides an 
analysis of the role of typical financial instruments of SIIin welfare policies 
through a descriptive and explorative analysis of the contractual scheme and 
of the technical and economic aspects of some currently existing SIBs and 
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DIBs and provides a comparison of SIBs and DIBs by highlighting their 
similarities, differences, opportunities and challenges. The results offer 
practical suggestions for professionals and policy makers to support suitable 
strategies for the evolution of these instruments in the delivery of welfare 
services. 
 
Keywords: Social Impact Bond, Development Impact Bond, Social and 
Sustainable Finance 
 
Introduction 
 Social Impact Investing (SII), defined as investment that aims to 
create a positive social impact in addition to a financial return, is a promising 
approach to solving pressing social issues (Hochstadter & Scheck, 2014). 
This enormous market opportunity covers four mega trends, namely, markets 
at the bottom of the pyramid, a green economy, the Lifestyle of Health and 
Sustainability (LOHAS) segment and the reconfiguration of welfare states 
(Martin, 2013). 
 One of the key topics in this context is represented in a new “pay-for-
performance” financing instrument for welfare services that has been 
implemented since 2010, especially in the UK, in the US and Australia, to 
facilitate impact investments: Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) (Social Finance 
UK, 2014c). 
 The extension of the scope of the SIB outcomes-based model to 
achieve improved social outcomes in developing countries implies the use of 
Developing Impact Bonds (DIBs) (Center for Global Development and 
Social finance, 2013). 
 Based on this assumption, our work aims to contribute to the 
academic debate on SII and to analyse the role of typical financial 
instruments of SII in welfare policies through a descriptive and explorative 
analysis of the contractual scheme and of the technical and economic aspects 
of some currently existing SIBs and DIBs, highlighting their similarities, 
differences, opportunities and challenges. 
 The methodology adopted is founded on a multiple case study 
approach (Yin, 2014). 
 This study is structured as follows. The next section provides a short 
literature review on this topic. This is followed by the methodological 
approach. The subsequent sections provide a brief description of the case 
studies, the findings, a discussion and a conclusion.  
 The results offer practical suggestions for professionals and policy 
makers to support suitable strategies for the evolution of these instruments in 
the delivery of welfare services. 
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Theoretical and methodological notes 
The contribution of social finance to welfare policies: The state of the art 
 Over the past two decades – and especially in the aftermath of the 
most recent economic and financial crisis– the reconfiguration of public 
expenditures has undergone significant changes that have posed new 
challenges, opportunities and threats to welfare policies and to their 
financing. The pressing constraints to public expenditureson welfare policies 
may be considered one of the main drivers for the development and diffusion 
of a financial innovation useful for social needs and social innovation (Social 
Impact Investment Italian Task Force, 2014; Azemati, Belinsky, Gillette, 
Liebman, Sellman & Wyse, 2013).  
 Especially in recent years, scholars, practitioners and policy makers 
have scrutinized the issue of the sustainability of the welfare system. In 
particular, the identification of new forms of financing and financial 
instruments able to attract private capital for the public sector in order to 
sustain (and integrate) social expenditure outline more and interesting 
questions (Del Giudice, 2015, p. 19).  
 Social Finance (SF) seems to be a useful construct to address these 
questions. 
 However, despite the recent growing interest in the literaturetowards 
this new stream of inquiry, there is not a clear understanding of what the 
term “Social Finance” stands for. 
 Different definitions of SF have been proposed by many authors.   
 This work adopts the approach used byWeber (2012), according to 
which SF can be considered “an umbrella term for financial products and 
services that strive to achieve a positive social, environmental or 
sustainability impact” (p.3). A positive social impact includes an impact on 
society, the environment, or sustainable development. SF attempts to achieve 
this by offering products and services, such as loans, investments, venture 
capital, and microfinance (Weber, 2012; Geobey & Weber, 2013). In the 
broad range of the SF landscape, Impact Investing has gained significant 
momentum in recent years (Martin, 2013). 
 Impact Investing is defined by the Canadian Task Force on Social 
Finance (2010, p. 5) as “the active investment of capital in businesses and 
funds that generate positive social and/or environmental impacts, as well as 
financial returns (from principal to above market rate) to the investor”. 
 The Impact Investing concept goes by many names (Hebb, 2013; 
Hochstadter & Scheck, 2014) and, as depicted by Hebb (2013), "these 
include double and triple bottom line, mission related investing, program-
related investment, blended-value, economically targeted investing and 
social finance" (p.71). Impact Investing is an emerging asset class that 
presents a special risk-return relation (O’Donohoe, Leijonhufvud, Saltuk, 
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Bugg-Levine and Brandenburg, 2010) and has characteristics similar to those 
of “high-yield” investments (O’Donohoe et al., 2010; Brandstetter & Lehner, 
2014; Geobey, Westley, & Weber, 2012). 
 The first academic studies on social impact investments were 
published in 2011. The potential market for SII is estimated to be between 
1000 and 14000 billion dollars (O’Donohoe et al., 2010), and it represents 
the most promising approach to solving social challenges (Jackson, 2013, p. 
608).  
 Our recent work(Rizzello, Caré, Migliazza & Trotta, 2015) explores 
the SII landscape. We provide a better picture of the existing state oftheSII 
academic landscape and note three main “domains” of research in this field: 
sustainable finance, impact entrepreneurship and public policy in the social 
sector. SIBs are closely related to the “public policy in the social sector” 
domain,includingother important terms such as Social Policy, Politics of 
Austerity, Social Outcome, New Public Management, Payment by Results, 
and Pay for Success, but have a key role in connecting the three domains. 
For these reasons, SIBs are one of the most promising pillars of the Impact 
Investing industry.  
 McHugh, Sinclair, Roy, Huckfield and Donaldson (2013, p. 247) 
define SIB as a new and innovative model of financial investment that can 
transform the supply of social services.  
 Considered one of the many innovative financing schemes garnering 
increasing attention in the social finance field (Demel, 2012), SIBs represent 
an expansion of the New Public Management approach into social program 
delivery through the use of its three main aspects: contracting, performance 
measurement, and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Warner, 2013, p. 
305). 
 SIBs are characterized by i) the participation of private and public 
actors in Public Private Partnership(s); ii) an initial monetary investment; iii) 
an action program. 
 However, with respect to SIBs, there are different definitions 
provided by scholars and practitioners.  
 Brandstetter and Lehner (2014) highlight that different regions use 
several terms. In Europe, these financial products are known as Social 
Impact Bonds. They are also known as Pay-for-success (PFS) in the United 
States and Social Benefit Bonds (SBBs) in Australia. The latest version of 
this financing scheme includes Development Impact Bonds (DIBs), which 
involve external development agencies and governments (Development 
Impact Bond Working Group, 2013; Saltuk, Bouri&Leug, 2011; Brandstetter 
& Lehner, 2014). As stated by Wilson, Silva and Ricardson (2015), DIBs are 
built around the SIB model and are also structured as Pay-for-success 
schemes focused on developing countries. Wilson (2014) shows that DIBs 
European Scientific Journal October 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
263 
"seek to improve the effectiveness of traditional donor-funded projects by 
shifting the focus on to implementation quality and the delivery of successful 
results by introducing private sector actors who may be better-positioned 
than the public sector to take on risks associated with innovation" (p.19). 
 Several Authors underline that SIBs represent a financing model 
adaptable to different social needs (Fox & Albertson, 2011; Hedderman, 
2013; Fitzgerald, 2013; Stoesz, 2014). According to Schinckus (2015, 
p.105), "SIBs are not a miracle way of financing welfare, they can 
significantly contribute to an improvement of society. By redesigning social 
programs through market-based solutions, SIBs enhance transparency and 
evaluation of expenditures made by government, and they can stabilize 
economic activity and they can contribute to the self-realization of 
disadvantaged people".   
 In light of this potential, these financial instruments represent one of 
the most promising fields of research, with many theoretical and empirical 
implications for the sustainability of welfare systems. 
 However, the academic literature on SIBs identifies several obstacles 
to their development in concreto. In particular, we underline the metrics of 
evaluation and the limits of the valuation of this instrument in a portfolio 
strategy (Brandstetter & Lehner, 2014; Jackson, 2013; Geobey & Weber, 
2013; Wood, Thornley & Grace, 2013; Geobey et al., 2012; Bugg-Levine, 
Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2012). 
 Furthermore, Saltuk et al. (2011) affirm that the lack of a track record 
of investment success is the major obstacle to this sector’s development.  
 Further studies in the academic debate are needed in order to analyse 
crucial matters and technical aspects. 
 
Methodological notes 
 This study uses a qualitative approach in order to achieve an 
exploratory analysis of Social Impact Bonds and Development Impact 
Bonds, with the goal of better understanding the differences and similarities 
between contractual arrangements and, in general, technical and economic 
aspects of different SIBs. 
 As stated by Kaczynski, Salmona & Smith (2014), "qualitative 
research is based on a very different frame of meaning construction that 
allows the researcher to explore and better understand social science issues at 
a deeper level" (p. 128). Moving from this point of view –given the wide 
range of qualitative approaches – the Multiple Case Study (MCS) 
methodology has been selected.  
 Eisenhardt (1989) underlines the potential of case studies to capture 
the dynamics of the studied phenomenon. Referring to the issue of 
generalization, Yin (1994) stresses the need to distinguish between statistical 
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generalization (where the researcher infers a population on the basis of 
empirical data collected on a statistical sample) and analytical generalization, 
which poses as the incorrect use of the first method to generalize the results 
of a case study.  
 In light of these specifications, the cases have been selected with the 
main aim of providing a better picture – and understanding –of the 
phenomenon. By using the intensity sampling approach, as described by 
Patton (2002), four case studies have been analysed. 
 In particular, in a non-random view, we have selected the following 
among currently existing SIBs: the “Increasing Employment and Improving 
Public Safety” Social Impact Bond (New York State – USA); the “Her 
Majesty’s Prison Peterborough” Social Impact Bond (UK); the “Newpin” 
Social Benefit Bond (Australia) and the “Sleeping Sickness” Development 
Impact Bond (Uganda). 
 The final sample is composed of information from rich cases that 
represent the phenomenon of interest intensely (but not extremely) (Patton, 
2002, p. 234).  
 To ensure the reliability of our study, we developed a research 
protocol (Yin, 2014). The research protocol provides the researchers the 
main sources of reliable data, the reporting procedure and the reporting 
outline. For the case study analysis, we used three primary data sources: i) 
official documents explaining technical and economic details (e.g., 
government documents, intermediary documents, and commissioner 
documents); ii) interviews with key informants; iii) reports and secondary 
sources (UK Government, Social Finance US, Social Venture Australia and 
related websites). 
  
The case study analysis 
A descriptive analysis of four case studies. 
 This Section, using a multiple case study approach, provides an 
analysis of the role of typical financial instruments of SII in welfare policies 
through a descriptive and explorative analysis of the contractual scheme and 
of the technical and economic aspects of some currently existing SIBs and 
DIBs. 
 
The case of the “Increasing Employment and Improving Public Safety” 
Social Impact Bond (New York State – USA). 
 During 2012, the State of New York (NYS) launched the policy 
strategy called "Work for Success"(NYS, 2012). Through this strategy, based 
on a Pay-for-success financing model for the delivery of rehabilitation 
services to ex-offenders, the State of New York promoted a Social Impact 
Bond called “Increasing Employment and Improving Public Safety”. New 
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York State identified Social Finance US49 as the project designer and 
manager of thisPay-for-success rehabilitation program. Starting from the 
analysis of the needs of formerly incarcerated individuals and from due 
diligence, Social Finance US selected the Center for Employment 
Opportunities (CEO)50 as a service provider of the SIB intervention.  
 From June 2013, NYS, Social Finance, and CEO worked together for 
the development and implementation of the project, while the NYS 
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Division of Program 
Planning, Research, and Evaluation (NYS DOCCS Research) and the New 
York State Department of Labor Research (NYS DOL Research) evaluated 
the outcomes through the Randomized Control Trial (RCT) methodology. 
Chesapeake Research Associates51is the independent validator (Social 
Finance US, CEO & NYS, 2014). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the core technical details of the SIB. 
Table 1. SIB “Increasing Employment and Improving Public Safety” (New York State - 
USA) 
Location New York City and Monroe County 
Country USA (New York State) 
Start date September 2013 
Contract duration 66 months 
Social Issue Prison recidivism 
Outcome metric 
a) Employment: percentage of formerly 
incarcerated individuals with positive earnings 
over the first year from release from prison; 
b) Recidivism: reduction of days 
incarcerated per person; 
c) Transitional Jobs: number of formerly 
incarcerated individuals who start a CEO 
Transitional job 
Threshold for payments from 
the outcome payer 
Outcome a): 5% increase in employment; 
Outcome b): 36.8-day reduction in recidivism.  
Threshold is established only for outcomes a and b. 
Outcome evaluation method 
and Evaluator 
Randomized Control Trial (metrics a and b). Validated 
administrative data (metric c). 
NYS Department of Corrections and Community 
                                                          
49Founded in 2011, Social Finance US is a nonprofit social impact financing and advisory 
firm, particularly dealing with the development of Pay for Success (PFS) financing. For 
further information, see: http://www.socialfinanceus.org. 
50Center for employment opportunities (CEO) is a nonprofit employment service agency for 
formerly incarcerated individuals. For further information, see: http://ceoworks.org. 
51Chesapeake Research Associates is a for-profit company founded in 2002 to provide 
research and evaluation services to federal and state governments, non-profit organizations, 
and businesses both in the US and abroad. Its main expertise is in the design, 
implementation, and reporting of randomized controlled trials (RCT) in education and other 
social policy areas. For further information, see http://www.chesapeake-research.com. 
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Supervision Research and NYS Department of Labor 
Research are the outcome evaluators; 
Validator Chesapeake Research Associates. 
Payments beyond threshold 
Outcome a): Phase I: $6,000 x pers.; Phase II: $6,360 x 
pers. 
Outcome b): Phase I: $85    x day; Phase II: $90.1 x day. 
Outcome c): Phase I: $3,120 x pers.; Phase II: $3,307 x 
pers. 
Source: Our elaborations. 
 
 The total capital raised for this intervention was$12,180,000, of 
which more than 90% covered CEO’s employment intervention for 2,000 
formerly incarcerated individuals. The remaining funds werefor Social 
Finance’s project and risk management services, Jones Day’s legal work, and 
Bank of America-Merrill Lynch’s work with impact investors (Social 
Finance US, CEO & NYS, 2014). Through its financial platform, Bank of 
America-Merrill Lynch raised the financial resources for the program from 
more than 40 impact investors and philanthropic foundations. Finally, the 
Rockefeller Foundation provided a 10% first-loss guarantee for a total 
amount of $1,320,000 (Social Finance US, CEO & NYS, 2014). Figure 1 
provides an overview of each stakeholder’s role in the project. 
Figure 1. Main actors of the “Increasing Employment and Improving Public Safety” SIB. 
 
Source: Social Finance US, CEO & NYS, 2014, p. 5 
 
 The total performance-based payment is capped at $21,540,000 
overall the two phases. This maximum amount of payments is equivalent, for 
impact investors, to approximately 12.5% annual implied IRR (Social 
Finance US, CEO and NYS, 2014). Performance-based payments are tied 
directly to the public sector savings and benefits estimated to result from the 
program’s social impact, and for this reason, such payments from 
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government never exceed the savings and benefits accruing to the public 
sector (Social Finance US, CEO and NYS, 2014). 
 The first cycle of the rehabilitation program is currently underway. 
The final results and, therefore, the first possible outcome-based payments 
are expected in the second half of 2017. 
 
The “HMP Peterborough” Social Impact Bond (United Kingdom). 
 In September 2010, the UK Government launched the first Social 
Impact Bond with the aim of reducing the reconviction rates of short-
sentence male prisoners leaving Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) of 
Peterborough. The intervention financed by the SIB provides interventions 
for male adults of at least 18 years old who received custodial sentences of 
fewer than 12 months and who were released from the HMP Peterborough 
prison.  
 The Ministry of Justice of the UK Government commissioned to 
Social Finance UK52 the design and management of the project. In March 
2010, Social Finance UK finalized the initial contracts for the SIB through 
the arrangement of the Social Impact Partnership, a Special Purpose Vehicle 
set up by Social Finance UK, as contracting entity for the SIB. In this 
contract, the Ministry of Justice and the Big Lottery Fund had the role of 
outcome payers, and One Service, the organization created by Social Finance 
UK specifically for the SIB, was the negotiation entity with social enterprise 
partners (such as St Giles Trust, Ormiston, SOVA, YMCA, and Mind) for 
providing services. The intervention concerns a package of intensive support 
services (called ONE Services), including housing assistance, drug and 
alcohol treatment, employment assistance, parenting assistance and mental 
health support, and was directed towards 3,000 short-term male prisoners 
aged 18 and older released from Peterborough Prison (Disley, Rubin, 
Scraggs, Burrowes & Cullery, 2011). The target population was divided into 
three cohorts, and each cohort included approximately 1,000 men discharged 
from short prison sentences at HMP Peterborough. Each cohort closed after 
two years, or when 1,000 offenders were released (Nicholls & Tomkinson, 
2013). It was expected that services would be delivered for approximately 
seven years53 (Disley & Rubin, 2014). Two cohorts received intervention. 
The service for the second cohort terminated on 30 June 2015. Table 2 
summarizes the technical information about the Peterborough SIB.  
                                                          
52Founded in 2007, Social Finance UK is a nonprofit social impact financing and advisory 
firm, particularly aimed at the development of Pay for Success (PFS) financing in the United 
Kingdom. For further information, see: http://www.socialfinance.org.uk. 
53See section 4.2.1 of the study for a discussion of the reduction in the duration of this SIB. 
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Table 2. SIB “HMP Peterborough” (United Kingdom) 
Location Peterborough, East of England 
Country United Kingdom 
Start date March 2010 
Contract duration 96 months 
Social Issue Prison recidivism 
Outcome metric Reduction in the re-offending rate over the 12 months following release from Peterborough Prison 
Threshold for payments from the 
outcome payer 
Reduction in re-offending by 10% for any of the three 
cohorts or 7.5% across all cohorts. 
Outcome evaluation method and 
Evaluator 
Matched control group (Quasi-experimental method); 
Qinetiq and the University of Leicester were selected 
as evaluator and validator of the results, respectively. 
Validator The evaluator also acted as independent validator. 
Payments beyond threshold Payment is made per re-conviction event reduced, up to a cap of £8 million 
Source: Our elaborations. 
 
Figure 2 highlights the main actors involved in the project. 
Figure 2. Main actors of the “HMP Peterborough”SIB.
 
Source: Nicholls & Tomkinson (2013), p. 14 
 
 The total investment raised for the SIB was £5 million from 17 
investors, and no first-loss guarantee was provided (Disley et al., 2011). 
 A minimum payment, equivalent to a return of 2.5% per annum, 
would be released by the MoJ and Big Lottery Fund to the Social Impact 
Partnership SPV and from this vehicle to investors if the reduction of 
reconviction events reached the threshold of 10% for any of the three cohorts 
of 1000 ex-prisoners or 7.5% across the entire 3000.  
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 Outcome-based payments, therefore, are scheduled at the end of each 
of the three cohorts if reduction in re-offending goes by 10% or, if not, at the 
end of the program. In the latter case, the threshold of reduction rate in re-
offending considered for payments is 7.5% across all cohorts.  
 Payments are capped at £8 million. This sum of maximum payment is 
equivalent to a maximum annual implied IRR of approximately 13%. 
 Actually, the intervention terminated for two cohorts. The evaluation 
of outcomes for the first cohort was announced from Social Finance UK in 
August 2014. The first group of 1000 prisoners registered an 8.4% reduction 
in re-offending relative to the comparable national baseline (Social Finance 
Uk, 2014b). Such results do not imply payments, at this stage, to the 
investors. However, the outcome payers will make payments to investors in 
2016 in the case of a reduction in re-offending of more than 7.5%. As 
evident from this announcement, Social Finance UK considered the 
threshold of 7.5% only for the first two cohorts. The change in payment 
schedule is due to the policy reform called “Transforming Rehabilitation” 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013) that caused the cancellation of the third cohort of 
the SIB (Social Finance UK, 2014a).  
  
The Newpin Social Benefit Bond (Australia) 
 In June 2013, NSW launched the first Australian SBB aimed to fund 
the maintenance and expansion of New Parent and Infant Network (Newpin), 
an important children and family program run by UnitingCare (Centre for 
Social Impact Bond, 2013b). Newpin is an intensive therapeutic program for 
families with children aged less than five years who are either in statutory 
out-of-home care or are at risk of harm (Centre for Social Impact Bond, 
2013a).Between 2008 and 2012, the Newpin program worked with more 
than 270 families and successfully restored over 120 children who were 
previously in out-of-home care to their families (Social Ventures Australia, 
2013). 
 Table 3 summarizes the main technical information about the Newpin 
SBB. 
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Table 3. SBB “Newpin” (AUSTRALIA). 
Location State of New South Wales 
Country Australia 
Start date June 2013 
Contract duration 87 months 
Social Issue Prison recidivism 
Outcome metric 
Outcome Payments (from the Outcome Payer to the 
Service Provider) are based on the number of 
participating children who are successfully restored to the 
care of their family (restoration is determined by the 
judiciary system), net of the counterfactual. 
Principal and interest payments made by the Service 
Provider to Investors are based on the proportion of 
children attending a Newpin Centre who are successfully 
restored to the care of their families. 
Threshold for payments from 
the outcome payer 
Payments from the Outcome Funder to the Service 
Provider are based upon the number of restorations, net of 
counterfactual. For this reason, the threshold is equivalent 
to the counterfactual. 
Payments of principal and interest to investors commence 
above a threshold Restoration Rate of 55%. 
Outcome evaluation method 
and Evaluator 
The evaluation method is based on historical comparison 
in the first three years and on a quasi-experimental and 
validated administrative data (from the judiciary system) 
in the remaining period. 
Deloitte is the independent evaluator. 
In detail, the counterfactual number of restorations in the 
first 3 years is 25% of the number of children completing 
the program (based on historical experience). Starting 
from the fourth year of implementation, the 
counterfactual restoration rate will be determined by the 
outcomes of a matched control group. 
With the goal of determining payments to investors, 
judiciary data are used to determine the restoration rate. 
Validator Deloitte. 
Payments beyond threshold 
Interest payments are based on cumulative restoration rate 
achieved: 
• Restoration rate <55% - Interest rate 0% 
• Restoration rate 55%   - Interest rate 3% 
• Restoration rate 60%    -Interest rate 7.5% 
• Restoration rate 65%   - Interest rate 12% 
• Restoration rate 70%   - Interest rate 15% 
Principal repaid on maturity date - between 50% and 
100% depending on restoration rate (100% if restoration 
rate >55%) 
Source: Our elaborations 
 
 The Newpin SBB reflects a social investment funding partnership 
between UnitingCare, the NSW Government and private sector investors 
with the purpose ofimproving social outcomes in the area of out-of-home 
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care, thereby producing benefits for the community, the Government, 
UnitingCare and investors over the expected seven-year delivery term. The 
funds raised by the Newpin SBB are planned to expand to 10 Newpin centres 
as well as to support over 700 families, approximately 350 of whom with at 
least one child age 5 or under who has been in government out of home care 
for at least 3 months, 175 with at least one child age 5 or under who has been 
assessed as at risk of serious harm and 175 families with at least one child 
age 5 or under who has been assessed as needing support. 
Social Ventures Australia (SVA) is the entity manager of Newpin SBB. 
Social Ventures Australia engaged to market the SBB via the SBB Trust, 
which was created to collect investor funds via the issuance of the Newpin 
SBB. The 59 investors include UnitingCare Burnside, high-net-worth 
individuals, family foundations and innovation funds.  
The three main financial flows that can occur during the implementation of 
the SBB are Interest Payments, Principal Repayment and Early Termination 
Payments. All the financial flows that occur between the actors of the SBB 
are summarized in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Main actors of the “Newpin”SIB. 
 
Source: Social Ventures Australia (2014), p. 28. 
 
 The capital repayment to the investors will be made on the maturity 
date fixed at 30 September 2020 by UnitingCare in a proportion determined 
by the restoration rate. More precisely, 100% of the capital invested will be 
repaid if the restoration rate over the full term is greater than 55% (Social 
European Scientific Journal October 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.1   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
272 
Ventures Australia, 2014). The early repayment to investors of the Newpin 
SBB occurs in the case of a low restoration rate or for any other reason that 
makes the Newpin Program undeliverable. In this case, the maximum 
potential loss of capital is 25% during the first four years and 50% thereafter 
(Social Ventures Australia, 2014). Finally, the annual interest payments are 
subject to a minimum interest rate of 5% p.a. over the first three years, while 
the maximum interest rate is 15% p.a. over the full term. The amount is 
related to the restoration rate, as indicated in Table 3. At the end of the first 
year of SBB implementation, interest payments were 7.5% based on the 
achieved outcome of 60% in the restoration rate. 
  
The “Sleeping Sickness” Development Impact Bond (Uganda) 
 InApril 2014, the UK Government announced the launch of the first 
Development Impact Bond (DIB) with the aim of researching and designing 
a bond to finance a long-term effort to reduce the prevalence and prevention 
of deadly sleeping sickness in Uganda (UK Gov, 2014).  
 The intended outcome ofthe implementation of a DIB is a long-term 
reduction in the prevalence rates of the sleeping sickness disease known as 
Human African Trypanosomiasis in both cattle and humans. The UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) promoted the design of 
an intervention through the DIB model in order to explore the possibility of 
encouraging social impact with greater efficiency and speed compared to an 
intervention bythe local government or by charities (UK Gov, 2014).   
 The DIB Inception Programme has been commissioned to Social 
Finance UK and the Center for Global Development.  
 The DIB Inception Programme is scheduled to be concluded before 
the end of 2015. In the first draft of the project, expected results are 
expressed both as output (number of cattle treated) and outcome (reduction 
in prevalence of a parasite determined by blood sampling) (DFID, 2014). At 
the present time, information about the investors, the service provider or the 
methodologies for measuring impact are unavailable. 
 
Main findings 
Prior results and discussion 
 The casestudy analysis shows a number of similarities and 
differences across SIBs and between SIBs and DIBs. The main aspects of 
each case are summarized in Table 4 and grouped into seven levels 
(Commissioner, Intervention Area, Financial Intermediary, Evaluator, 
Outcome Payer, Duration, and Validator). The absence of certain data in case 
4 is due to the case’s early stage of development. 
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Table 4: Case Study analysis 
Case # Case 1 # Case 2 # Case 3 # Case 4 
Commissioner State of New York 
British Ministry 
of Justice 
Department of 
Family and 
Community 
Services 
(FACS) 
UK 
Government 
and Department 
for International 
Development 
(DFID) 
Intervention 
Area 
Rehabilitation 
Services - 
Recidivism 
reduction 
Rehabilitation 
Services - 
Recidivism 
reduction 
Children 
Disease 
treatment 
(HAT) 
Financial 
Intermediary 
Social Finance 
US 
Social Finance 
UK 
Social Ventures 
Australia 
The DIB 
Inception 
Programme has 
been 
commissioned 
to Social 
Finance UK and 
the Center for 
Global 
Development 
Evaluator 
NYS 
Department of 
Corrections and 
Community 
Supervision 
Research and 
NYS 
Department of 
Labor Research 
QintetiQ and 
University of 
Leicester 
Deloitte 
Touche 
Tohmatsu 
* 
Outcome payer 
US Department 
of Labor and 
NYS 
Department of 
Labor 
Ministry of 
Justice 
and Big Lottery 
Fund 
Department of 
Family and 
Community 
Services 
(FACS) 
DFID 
Duration 66 Months 96 Months 84 Months * 
Validator 
Chesapeake 
Research 
Associates 
The same as the 
evaluator 
The same as 
the evaluator * 
* Case 4 is in the design phase. Data are not available. 
Source: Our elaborations. 
 
 The case study of the“Sleeping sickness”Development Impact Bond 
shows some differences with respect to the other SIBs. The commissioner is 
not the local Government, but an international organization or development 
agency, and the outcome payer is represented byDFID and not bythe Country 
where the intervention will be delivered.  
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 However, starting from the available data, this DIB shows a 
contractual arrangement derived from those used in the Social Impact Bond 
model. Consequently, the DIB model requires the presence of impact 
investors and a market intermediary, such as in the SIB practices.  
 In case 1, Social Finance US plays a central role in the SIB structure. 
It designs, coordinates and manages the project through the Special Purpose 
Vehicle “Social Finance NYS Workforce Re-entry LLC”. It also manages 
financial flows between impact investors, service providers and outcome 
payers. The intervention of a financial intermediary in the collection of social 
impact investments characterizes the start-up phase of this Social Impact 
Bond.  
 In the Peterborough SIB, the management model in the start-up phase 
represents the first case in whichthe commissioner plays more of a passive 
role and allows the intermediary to play anactive role. Furthermore, in the 
case study of the United Kingdom, the service provider – One Service – 
carries out the activities included in the rehabilitation program in order to 
educate prisoners using the different entities that form it: the intermediary, 
Social Finance UK, which has control, the investors and the service provider 
itself. Another typical characteristic of this SIB is the management company, 
Social Impact Partnership-Limited Partnership, which is owned by Social 
Finance as the general partner and in which participate, in addition to One 
Service, 17 different investors who have financed the project.  
 A further interesting aspect is the method of measurement and 
validation of results. From the comparison ofthe case studies (Tab. 4), the 
validator coincides with the evaluator two out of four times.  
 With regard to similarities, the analysis shows that i) both models 
(SIBs and DIBs) are aimed to solve social problems by offering the investors 
the potential for a return on their investment; ii) both models show similar 
component structures, such as public engagement, service providers, and 
investors. Table 5 provides a summary of the main advantages and limiting 
factors of the SIB and DIB financing models.  
Table 5: Major advantages and limiting factors of Social Impact Bonds 
ADVANTAGES LIMITING FACTORS 
Flexibility in terms of involved stakeholders, 
supplied services, delivery method, objectives and 
results, timeline 
No track record 
Ability to combine "evidence-based" models and 
tools with financial returns / Immediate 
connection between outcomes reached and 
performance 
Legal restriction 
 
Several areas of intervention: Health, Education, 
Criminal Justice, etc. 
Financial Returns and cash flows unknown / 
difficulties in terms of portfolio evaluation 
 No guaranteed funds or insurance for investors 
Risk transfer 
Source: Our elaborations. 
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 Furthermore, a key dimension of analysis is the relationship between 
risk and reward. More specifically, through their contractual structure, SIBs 
move a relevant level of risk toinvestors,whoconsequently require 
appropriate rewards. The analysis of data highlights that risks linked to the 
success of the program are transferred to private actors, and this aspect 
generates a significant increase inthe yield of the same SIB. These 
considerations seem to confirm the following proposition by O'Donohoe et 
al. (2010, p. 66): "impact investing refers to a particular relation between risk 
and return that allows considering it to be similar to "high-yield" 
investments". 
 Table 6 provides a comparison between the implied rates of return 
available in the cases.  
Table 6: Implied Rate of Return comparison 
 
“Increasing Employment 
and Improving Public 
Safety” 
(New York State - USA) 
“HMP Peterborough” 
(UK) 
Implied IRR 12.5% 13% 
Source: Our elaborations. 
 
 The implied IRRs outlined in Table 6 are higher than the yield of a 
government bond. This aspect is strictly related tothe fact that a government 
bond ensures that cash will always be available to pay out the bondholders, 
but this is not true for a SIB in which the rate of return is related to the 
outcome reached and no guarantees are provided. Furthermore, if we 
consider the IRR, we evaluate SIBs and DIBs in terms of risk and return, and 
we can allocate this instrument throughthe lensof portfolio maximization. 
However, the investors that chose this type of investment take into 
consideration a third dimension: social impact.  
  
Further lines of research 
 This work aimed at analysing the role of SIBs (and DIBs) inwelfare 
policies through a descriptive and explorative analysis oftheir contractual 
scheme and technical and economic aspects, highlighting similarities, 
differences, opportunities and challenges. 
 The case studies outlined in this work indicate some potential benefit 
among a wide range of stakeholders from the public andprivate sectors. In a 
context of public spending constraints and public debt pressure, many 
advantages resultfrom the use of new financing models, such as that of SIBs 
and DIBs, especially by bringing in new players and new capital. 
 Furthermore, case studies seem to confirm what is stated in the 
academic debate: SIBs represent a financing model adaptable to different 
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social needs (Fox & Albertson, 2011; Hedderman, 2013; Fitzgerald, 2013; 
Stoesz, 2014).  
 Our results notethe weakness outlined in the general literature and 
relate to the metrics of evaluation and to the financial return uncertaintyof 
SIBs. Similar to traditional investors, "social impact investors" require a 
measurable return. The presence of public entities – and especially 
Governments – in the broad range of stakeholders is not enough to ensure the 
success of the investment.  
 In addition, we highlight some aspects that need further investigation 
and that are related to the opportunityto improve standardized but still 
flexible evaluation tools that are able to take into consideration the financial 
return, the social impact and the different kinds of risks related to these 
particular financing schemes. Future research should explore the investment 
evaluation process not only through the lens of the rational decision-making 
process but also considering what really drives impact investors' decisions. 
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